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Looking back on US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan to 
date, three key issues stand out: one substantive, one procedural and one 
policy. The substantive matter – what are the minimum baseline treatment 
standards required as a matter of international law? – has clarified 
significantly during the course of operations there, largely as a result of the 
US Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1 The procedural 
matter – what adjudicative processes does international law require for 
determining who may be detained? – eludes consensus and has become more 
controversial the longer the Afghan conflict continues. And the policy matter 
– in waging counterinsurgency warfare, how do foreign military forces 
transition military detention operations to effective civilian institutions? – 
has emerged as a critical strategic priority for which the law of armed 
conflict provides little instructive guidance. 
After briefly outlining the basis of US and coalition detention operations, 
this article addresses each of these issues in turn. It concludes with some 
general observations about the convergence of law and strategy. 
 
I. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND DETENTION 
OPERATIONS 
 
In late 2001, the United States launched operations in Afghanistan, and 
almost immediately began capturing and holding suspected enemy fighters.2 
The United States’ legal authority for detention operations in Afghanistan 
began from the propositions that: 
 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (U.S.A.); Adjunct Senior Fellow, 
Council on Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National 
Security and Law. An earlier version of this paper was presented at and published by the 
U.S. Naval War College. 
1  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
2  See T. Bowman & G. Gibson, “U.S. Still Mulling Options on POWs”, Baltimore Sun, 
Dec. 8, 2001, at A1; P. Richter, “U.S. Lays Plans for Interrogation, Trials”, L.A. Times, 
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398872
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The United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against 
al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. There is no 
question that under the law of armed conflict, the United States has the 
authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful belligerence 
until the cessation of hostilities. Like other wars, when they start we do 
not know when they will end. Still, we may detain combatants until the 
end of the war.3 
 
Although many US allies participated in military operations there, US forces 
took the lead in conducting detention operations in Afghanistan,4 eventually 
consolidating theater detention operations at facilities in Bagram air force 
base.  
As explained by a commander of US detention forces in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), “[d]uring the execution of this campaign, the US 
Armed Forces and allied forces have captured or procured the surrender of 
thousands of individuals believed to be members or supporters of either al 
Qaeda or the Taliban”.5 The purpose of these detentions has been to 
  
[prevent] them from returning to the battlefield and engaging in further 
armed attacks against innocent civilians and U.S. and coalition forces. 
Detention also serves as a deterrent against future attacks by denying the 
enemy the fighters needed to conduct war. Interrogations during 
detention enable the United States to gather important intelligence to 
prevent future attacks.6 
 
Seven years after the initial invasion, US detention operations go on, and the 
US military is modernizing its facilities in the expectation of their further 
 
3  UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 
1999, Addendum (United States of America) Annex 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 
(May 6, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm#part_one;  
 see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-21 (2004) (recognizing the executive 
branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants – at least those captured in the course of 
operations in Afghanistan – pursuant to the congressional “Authorization for Use of 
Military Force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks). 
4  As well as transferring several hundred detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, 
though I do not discuss those legal issues here. 
5  Declaration of Colonel R.M. Miller, para. 8, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707 
(GK) (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2006). 
6  Id. 
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continuation.7 While the new Obama Administration has pledged to close 
Guantanamo early in its tenure, plans for continued detention operations in 
Afghanistan move forward.8 
In some respects US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan 
are a valuable case study for examining contemporary application of the law 
of armed conflict. Aside from the thousands of individual detentions, the 
“data” include publicly released and declassified documents of internal US 
government legal and policy decision-making, as well as litigation that has 
pushed the US government to clarify its legal positions and has produced 
judicial interpretations of the law of armed conflict.  
In others respect, however, it is difficult to examine the law of armed 
conflict in the Afghanistan setting because of some peculiar aspects of 
detention operations there. First, most US allies participating in coalition 
operations in Afghanistan have done so not as part of anti-Taliban and Al 
Qaeda combat operations (Operation Enduring Freedom) but as part of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The latter, which assists the 
Afghan government in maintaining security in certain parts of the country, is 
authorized by a series of Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions that 
authorize participating contingents to “take all necessary measures to fulfil 
its mandate”.9 Participating military forces therefore derive authority to 
detain certain captured militants from this UN Security Council mandate 
independent of the law of armed conflict. Additionally, US allies 
participating in both OEF and ISAF have almost entirely “opted out” of 
detention operations. In 2005, NATO adopted guidelines, which the 
European partners follow, calling for transferring detainees to the Afghan 
government within ninety-six hours of capture.10 As explained further below, 
this has meant that US detentions form almost the only significant body of 
State practice in Afghanistan to measure against or help interpret the law of 





7  See E. Schmitt & T. Golden, “U.S. Planning Big New Prison in Afghanistan”, N.Y. Times, 
May 17, 2008, at A01. 
8  See W. Richey, “Next Flash Point over Terror Detainees: Bagram Prison”, Christian 
Science Monitor, Feb.12, 2009. 
9  See S.C. Res. 1707, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006); S C. Res. 1386, 
para. 3, S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
10  See A.S. Deeks, “Starting From Here”, in International Law and Military Operations (M. 
D. Carsten ed., 2008) (84 US Naval War College Int’l L. Studies Series).  
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II. DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS 
 
In the early phases of military operations in Afghanistan, but especially after 
the Abu Ghraib crisis in Iraq, followed by gruesome disclosures of detainee 
abuses in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, the greatest public controversy 
focused on the issue of detainee treatment standards. Much of this debate 
centered on the appropriate classification of captured Taliban and Al Qaeda 
fighters, because most protagonists in this debate believed that the 
appropriate treatment baseline turned in part on captured individuals’ legal 
status.11  
On October 17, 2001, shortly before conventional combat operations 
began, US military commanders in charge of Afghanistan operations issued 
an order instructing that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were to be applied to 
all captured individuals. Belligerents would be screened according to 
standard doctrine to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner 
of war status.12 This was consistent with existing military regulations and 
recent US military practice. 
On February 7, 2002, however, the President determined that Taliban and 
Al Qaeda detainees were “unlawful combatants”,13 and therefore protected 
by neither the custodial standards of the Third Geneva Convention 
applicable to prisoners of war nor common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.14 Prisoner of war protections did not cover Al Qaeda detainees 
 
11  See A. Roberts, “The Prisoner Question: If the U.S. Has Acted Lawfully, What’s the 
Furor About?”, Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2002, at B1. 
12  See J.R. Schlesinger et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel To Review Detention 
Operations 80 (2004), at: news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf. 
13  See Memorandum from G. Bush to Vice President et al., “Humane Treatment of Al 
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” (Feb. 7, 2002), repr. in The Torture Papers – The Road to 
Abu Ghraib 134 (K.J. Greenberg & J. Dratel eds., 2005), at: 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf  
 [hereinafter: President’s Memo]. 
14  Art. 3 is referred to as “common” because it is found identically in each of the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter: Geneva 
Convention III]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter: Geneva Convention IV]; all repr. in 
Documents on the Laws of War (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000) at 197, 222, 
244 and 301, respectively. Art. 3 applies to all cases “… of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contacting Parties . . 
.”. 
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because Al Qaeda was not a “High Contracting Party” to the Conventions, 
and they did not cover Taliban because those forces failed the tests of Article 
4 of the Third Convention, which stipulates requirements for legitimate 
military forces.15 Common Article 3 did not apply, by its own terms, because 
this was believed to be an international armed conflict, whereas Common 
Article 3 rules apply in conflicts “not of an international character”.16  
The President further directed in his February 2002 instructions, however, 
that “[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue 
to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with 
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva”.17 
But while ostensibly protective, this directive also opened holes in the law of 
armed conflict’s barriers. First, it applied by its terms only to armed forces, 
hinting that intelligence services might not be similarly constrained. Second, 
by emphasizing humane treatment as a matter of policy, it suggested that 
humane treatment was not required as a matter of law. And third it suggested 
that the Geneva Conventions’ principles could validly be compromised in 
pursuit of security requirements.  
Well known is the storm of criticism that erupted over the initial US 
government position that the Geneva Conventions – and, presumably, 
customary law of armed conflict – provided no legal guarantee of minimum 
detention treatment standards. Many critics have attributed detainee abuses 
in Afghanistan to these foundational legal decisions. Critics of the US 
position consistently rejected the notion that unlawful combatants fall into a 
“legal gap” in protection, and they asserted a range of plugs, including that 
captured fighters (at least Taliban) were entitled to prisoner of war status; 
that all captured fighters are entitled at least to minimum protections of 
Common Article 3, Article 75 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions,18 and the customary law of armed conflict; and/or that any 
detainees are protected by international human rights law, including 
prohibitions on “cruel, inhuman and degrading” treatment.19  
 
15  See President’s Memo, supra note 13. For a contrary view, see Memorandum from W.H. 
Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State to Counsel to the President, Comments on Your 
Paper on the Geneva Conventions (Feb. 2, 2002), repr. in Torture Papers, supra note 13, 
at 129, at: http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf). 
16  See President’s Memo, supra note 13. 
17  Id. 
18  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, Art. 4, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 4, repr. in Documents on the Laws of War, supra note 14, at 422. 
19  See J.B. Bellinger, US State Dep’t Legal Advisor, “Oxford Leverhulme Programme 
Lecture on the Changing Character of War”, (Dec.10, 2007). 
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In June 2006 the US Supreme Court resolved much of this debate, at least 
as a matter of international law incorporated into US law. It held in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, a petition brought by a Yemeni detained during OEF and 
transferred to Guantanamo, that common Article 3 affords minimal 
protections to individuals captured within the territory of a signatory but 
engaged in a conflict not between two nations. This would include not only 
civil wars (as common Article 3 is more traditionally understood) but also 
conflicts with transnational actors like Al Qaeda.20 Soon after, on July 7, 
2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that “all DoD personnel 
adhere to [common Article 3] standards” and that each Department 
component “review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices 
and procedures . . . to ensure that they comply with [them]”.21  
Hamdan’s holding that common Article 3’s minimum treatment 
standards apply to individuals captured in Afghanistan significantly 
narrowed the scope of controversy over international legal constraints on US 
detention operations. Common Article 3 demands that detainees “in all 
circumstances be treated humanely”, and it prohibits, among other things, 
“cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment”.22 Some of these terms are 
vague. But they contain basic care and custody requirements that match 
closely the minimal treatment standards of human rights law that many 
critics argued applied.23 While not matching the enhanced protections 
afforded prisoners of war, this holding nevertheless answered the criticism of 
those critics who argued that the Geneva Conventions contain no “gaps” in 
their coverage of individuals detained in armed conflict. Perhaps most 
important, this holding clarified that these minimal treatment standards apply 
as a matter of treaty law of armed conflict, not merely policy.  
 
III. DETENTION ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURES 
 
The Hamdan holding went far in clarifying the minimal treatment standards 
applicable to Afghanistan detention operations, but the sparse terms of 
 
20  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 1, at 629-31.  
21  Memorandum from G. England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments et al., “Application of Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense”, (July 7, 2006), at: 
 http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/For-the-record/documents/20060711.html. 
22  Supra note 14. 
23  See International Committee of the Red Cross, “US Detention Related to the Fight 
Against Terrorism – the Role of the ICRC”, Feb. 24, 2009, at: 
 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-states-detention-faq-240209. 
 DETENTION OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 7 
 
common Article 3 do little to clarify the separate issue of what minimal 
procedural requirements govern decisions to detain or continue to detain 
individuals in Afghanistan.24 Procedural mechanisms for reviewing detention 
decisions in Afghanistan have received remarkably little public scrutiny 
compared with those at Guantanamo, even though in many respects – at least 
as initially characterized by the US government – the detainees in both are 
similarly situated. Thus far the war in Afghanistan does more to highlight the 
difficult issue of procedural safeguards in the law of armed conflict than it 
does to answer it. 
In the early phases of coalition operations in Afghanistan, much of the 
legal debate about procedural detention issues focused on Article 5 of the 
Third Geneva Convention, the Prisoner of War Convention. It provides that 
“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy” qualify as 
prisoners of war, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal”.25 Then, as now, however, little State practice or detailed 
authoritative commentary existed interpreting these terms. US military 
regulations called for a three officer panel that would take testimony from 
reasonably available witnesses, including the detainee, and make 
judgments.26 And US military forces were preparing to conduct such 
tribunals for individuals captured in Afghanistan until they were directed 
otherwise, eventually by the President’s February 7, 2002 legal 
determinations which rendered any captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters 
“unlawful combatants” as a matter of law; hence there was not “any doubt” 
as to their status for Article 5 tribunals to adjudicate.27 
Some critics contested this claim, arguing that Article 5 requires case-by-
case determinations; that group designations of this sort are impermissible.28 
Others have argued that this provision means that when there is doubt 
 
24  Some of the sparse State practice on this issue, for example US practice during the 
Vietnam War and procedures employed by Canadian and British militaries, is described 
in R. Chesney & J. Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models”, 60 Stanford L. Rev. 1079, 1090-92 (2008). 
25  Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, Art 5. 
26  See Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine 
Corps, Army Regulation 190–8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy 
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § 1-6(a) 
(1997), at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf. 
27  See K.Q. Seelye, “Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare”, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6. 
28  See M. Ratner, “Letter to the Editor, When Are Captives Prisoners of War?”, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 16, 2002, at A18. 
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whether a captured individual is even an enemy fighter or not, he is entitled 
to a hearing before a tribunal; therefore, the argument goes, suspected Al 
Qaeda and Taliban combatants in US custody at Guantanamo and elsewhere 
should have been entitled upon capture to such review.29 Article 5’s 
language begins with the notion that a subject detainee has “committed a 
belligerent act”, suggesting that the drafters intended to mandate minimum 
procedures for resolving factual doubt as to a subject’s type of combatant or 
belligerent, not the prior question whether he is or is not a combatant. 
Nevertheless, in practice any process to adjudicate an individual’s type of 
combatancy, and hence the Geneva protections to which he is entitled, would 
likely uncover some cases of mistaken identity or otherwise erroneous 
detentions.30 
Regardless of its precise meaning, it seems quite clear that Article 5 was 
drafted with very different circumstances in mind than those of the 
Afghanistan conflict. In particular, it was intended for a conflict pitting 
professional armies and of limited duration.31 A relatively simple front-end 
adjudicatory review was sufficient in such conflicts because sorting 
combatants from noncombatants (for detention purposes) was relatively easy 
and conflicts would likely end within a few months or years anyway, 
whereupon any remaining captives would be released. Afghanistan, by 
contrast, involves a set of conflicts already lasting over seven years and 
likely to continue many more and an enemy force (especially Al Qaeda 
forces, but also residual Taliban) that routinely obscures its identity among 
civilian populations.32  
In this context, the more important issue than appropriate front-end status 
screening is to what form of review and perhaps adversarial process are 
detainees entitled to contest the factual basis of their detention, given the 
relatively high probability and cost of errors. Three main positions have 
emerged, though there are many sub-positions within each one.33  
 
29  See, e.g., W.M. Reisman, “Rasul v. Bush: A Failure to Apply International Law”, 2 J. 
Int’l Crim. Just. 973 (2004). 
30  In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military conducted about twelve hundred such 
hearings for captured Iraqi individuals thought to be pro-Saddam fighters, and found 
about nine hundred of them to be displaced civilians, who were promptly released. See 
Dep’t of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress 578 (2002). 
31  Commentary on Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(ICRC, J.S. Pictet ed., 1960). 
32  See M.C. Waxman, “Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of 
Suspected Terrorists”, 108 Columbia L. Rev. 1365 (2008). 
33  For a discussion of this debate, see M. Hakimi, “International Standards for Detaining 
Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide”, 33 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 369, 389-92 (2008). 
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The United States has generally taken the position that the law of armed 
conflict is the exclusive body of international law dictating procedural 
constraints on detention of captured fighters in Afghanistan. This position 
assumes the continued existence of armed conflict (in the US view, it 
remains an international armed conflict, though Hamdan at least adds new 
questions to this view), and that the law of armed conflict operates as lex 
specialis displacing otherwise applicable legal norms.34 Beyond consistently 
arguing against the reach of judicial habeas corpus protections to 
Afghanistan,35 however, the US government has not articulated any clear 
procedural mandates imposed by the law of armed conflict for sorting out 
who is or is not a combatant. Instead it has preferred to maintain flexibility, 
relying (as explained further below) on procedural mechanisms adopted as a 
matter of policy. 
Some human rights organizations have taken the position that, especially 
since the establishment of the new Afghan government following the 2002 
Loya Jirga, international human rights law, not the law of armed conflict, 
governs procedural protections, along with Afghan domestic law.36 This 
view generally assumes that the war in Afghanistan evolved from an 
international armed conflict to an internal armed conflict and that the law of 
armed conflict provides no independent authorization for detention in the 
latter category.37 Holders of this view look to – among other sources – the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: 
 
34  See J.B. Bellinger, US State Dep’t Legal Advisor, “Remarks to the Committee Against 
Torture”, (May 5, 2006), at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68557.htm;  
 Bellinger, supra note 19. 
35  See, e.g., Government’s Motion to Dismiss, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, Civ. Action No. 06-
CV-01669 (JDB), D.D.C., Filed Mar. 5, 2007; Government’s Response to Order to Show 
Cause and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, Civ. 
Action No. 06-CV-01707 (GK), filed Nov. 20, 2006, D.D.C. The Obama Administration 
has so far indicated it will retain this position, opposing federal habeas jurisdiction at 
Bagram. See C. Savage, “Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in Afghanistan”, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 22, 2009; N. Pickler & M. Apuzzo, “Obama Backs Bush: No Rights for Bagram 
Prisoners”, Assoc. Press, Feb. 21, 2009. 
36  See “Arbitrary Justice: Trials of Bagram and Guantanamo Detainees in Afghanistan”, 
Human Rights First, Apr. 2008; T. Golden & D. Rohde, “Afghans Hold Secret Trials for 
Men That U.S. Detained”, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2008, at A6 (citing criticisms from human 
rights organizations). 
37  Human Rights Watch has taken the position that the transfer of power in Afghanistan to 
the Karzai government converted the conflict from an international one to a non-
international one. See Human Rights Watch, Enduring Freedom, Mar. 7, 2004, Part IV,  
at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/03/07/enduring-freedom.  
 It explains: “During a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law as 
the lex specialis (specialized law) takes precedence, but does not replace, human rights 
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No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law . . . Anyone 
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if 
the detention is not lawful.38 
 
Under the strictest form of this view, any long-term detention of suspected 
Taliban or Al Qaeda agents in Afghanistan requires criminal trial with 
universally-recognized due process safeguards; a standard that leaves US 
practice in Afghanistan falling far short.39 
A third view holds that neither the law of armed conflict nor human rights 
treaty law provide sufficiently clear or comprehensive procedural safeguards 
to persons detained for security reasons. Thus, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed a set of principles and safeguards 
that should govern security detention in all circumstances, i.e., in both armed 
conflicts and outside of them. The guidelines are based on law of armed 
conflict and human rights treaty rules, as well as on non-binding standards 
and best practice, and are to be interpreted on a case by case basis. 
According to the guidelines, detainees have – among other things – the right 
to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and to have an independent and 
impartial body decide on continued detention or release.40 The ICRC 
considers that Afghanistan is a situation of non-international armed conflict: 
it would argue that detainees in US or other international force hands should 
enjoy far more robust procedural rights than currently afforded and that 
detainees in Afghan custody should be granted judicial review.41  
                      
law. … [W]here [international humanitarian law] is absent, vague, or inapplicable, human 
rights law standards still apply”. Id. 
38  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
39  See, e.g., “US Detentions in Afghanistan: An Aide-Memoire for Continued Action”, 
Amnesty International, June 7, 2005, at: 
 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/093/2005/en/dom-
AMR510932005en.pdf (“When [the] armed conflict ended [in 2002], those who were 
captured by the USA during hostilities . . . were required to be released, unless charged 
with criminal offenses. Civilians detained in that conflict . . . too were required, when that 
conflict ended, to be released, unless charged with recognized criminal offences”). 
40  See ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts”, Official Working Document of the 30th International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Nov. 2007, Annex 1; J. Pejic, “Procedural Principles 
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence”, 87 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 375 (2005). 
41  See ICRC, “US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and Its Aftermath 
– The Role of the ICRC”, July 30, 2008, at: 
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The experience in Afghanistan offers intuitive support for the third 
approach, but it does little to resolve the difficult issue of exactly which 
international human rights law provisions should apply. The fact that the 
nature of fighting there – an enemy that deliberately obscures its identity and 
moves in and out of local communities – creates a high likelihood of 
erroneous, long-term detentions supports the call for thorough screening 
procedures.42 But the combat conditions, resource constraints and weak state 
of Afghan justice would complicate efforts to establish formal judicial 
mechanisms by either coalition or the Afghan governments.43 
Meanwhile, the US Supreme Court recently held in Boumediene v. Bush 
that enemy combatants at Guantanamo are entitled to constitutional habeas 
corpus rights.44 The issue of Boumediene’s reach beyond Guantanamo, 
especially to Afghanistan, will be litigated for some time, though that case 
turned on interpretation and application of US domestic law. In any event, 
the Supreme Court did not clarify exactly what procedural structures and 
protections apply even in habeas cases for Guantanamo detainees, and the 
Court seemed to have Afghanistan in mind when it cautiously suggested that 
practical considerations and exigencies of foreign combat zones might limit 
the reach of constitutional habeas rights to enemy combatant detainees 
beyond Guantanamo.45 
Law aside, US forces have instituted more formalized procedural 
mechanisms for adjudicating detention decisions as time has gone on.46 The 
little detail on review processes in Afghanistan shared openly by the US 
government appears mostly in court filings in habeas corpus actions brought 
by Bagram detainees. These documents explain that by 2006 all individuals 
brought to theater detention facilities for long-term confinement have their 
cases reviewed by a five-officer panel, sitting as an Enemy Combatant 
Review Board, usually within seventy-five days of capture and thereafter 
every six months. The Review Board may recommend by a majority vote to 
the commanding general or his designee whether the individual should 
continue to be detained.47 Note that while the US government maintains that 
                      
 http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/usa-detention-update-121205?opendocument. 
42  See Waxman, supra note 32, at 1402-29. 
43  How much these efforts would be complicated is the source of significant debate between 
the US government and human rights organizations. 
44  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
45  See ibid., at 2259-62. 
46  For a general discussion of how enemy combatant adjudications have evolved during the 
course of the “Global War on Terrorism”, see Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 24. 
47  See Declaration of Col. J.W. Gray, para. 11-13, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669 
(JDB) (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2007)(discussing review process for detainees in Afghanistan); 
Declaration of Col. R.M. Miller, para. 10-12, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707 
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the Fourth Geneva Convention is inapplicable as a matter of law to 
Afghanistan detainees because that Convention applies to civilians, not 
combatants, the processes US forces eventually put in place roughly track 
the requirements of Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular 
processes and periodic review (at least every six months) for security 
internees.48  
So far, then, the Afghanistan case has produced little legal consensus on 
minimum procedural requirements in part because the spectrum of views 
span differing judgments on such basic questions as what type of conflict 
exists (international versus internal), what body of law applies (law of armed 
conflict versus human rights law versus domestic Afghan law, or some 
combination), and what specific minimum requirements those bodies of law 
impose (mandatory provisions versus a sliding scale depending on 
practicability). Meanwhile, US forces have adopted increasingly robust 
processes for adjudicating cases, suggesting at least a partial – though still 
far from complete – convergence between the aspirations of restrictive legal 
views and the pragmatic and ethical tendencies of those charged with waging 
the conflict.  
 
IV. TRANSITIONING DETENTION OPERATIONS  
TO CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS 
 
A final issue to consider is the transition from a military detention to civilian 
criminal justice system in Afghanistan. Unlike the substantive and 
procedural standards issues discussed above, this is not a law of armed 
conflict issue in a strict sense (except for Geneva Convention rules 
governing repatriation). But it is entwined with the other legal issues, and the 
strategic necessity of resolving it effectively has implications for the future 
development of the law of armed conflict. 
The law of armed conflict is generally understood as designed to 
minimize unnecessary suffering in wartime and to facilitate a return to peace 
and public order. In the context of conventional warfare, the law of armed 
conflict’s detention authorities and rules generally serve well these goals: 
until order is restored through victory or settlement of the conflict they allow 
– with reduced procedural requirements compared to peacetime justice 
systems – the incapacitation of captured individuals presumed (or assessed) 
likely to fight again if released and they protect those individuals from 
                      
(GK) (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2006) (discussing detention procedures and review process for 
enemy combatants detained in Afghanistan). 
48  See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, Art. 78. 
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mistreatment. For the most part, the rules align with the law’s policy 
objectives, including the strategic necessities of detention during combat. 
US detention operations have taken place in Afghanistan amid a different 
and more complex strategic environment. Operations have evolved to 
include a major counterinsurgency component against Taliban and al Qaeda 
forces conducting guerrilla-style and terrorist operations aimed to undermine 
the new Afghan government. Of course, the role and rules of detention in 
counterinsurgency conflicts is not a new problem or unique problem. One 
aspect that distinguishes the Afghanistan case, however, is the weakness or 
embryonic condition of State institutions, including law and order systems, 
which needed to be almost completely reconstituted after coalition and 
Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Indeed, the collapse or 
weakness of governance in many parts of the country and the inability of the 
State to provide basic State services like policing and criminal justice creates 
an environment hospitable to insurgent forces.49 Moreover, the Afghan 
government lacks effective institutions of governance, including a police and 
justice sector capable of maintaining order. This is not just a 
counterinsurgency campaign to save a mature government but a 
counterinsurgency campaign while building a new government in a region 
long accustomed to warlordism.  
Against this backdrop, 2004 Pentagon inspection and assessment of US 
detention operations in Afghanistan concluded that “US detainee operations 
can only be normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and 
corrections system that can assume the responsibility for the long-term 
detention of low level enemy combatants currently held by the US”.50 The 
report continued: 
 
The value of continuing to keep low-level enemy combatants in custody 
is simply to keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition 
forces off the battlefield. This is a function that can and should be 
undertaken by the Afghan government. . . . Despite efforts to improve the 
process, the press of a growing detainee population without an Afghan 
solution or continued transfer to GTMO will continue to create the 
potential for bad choices to be made at several points in that process.51 
 
In 2005 the governments of the United States and Afghanistan reached 
diplomatic agreements to “allow for the gradual transfer of Afghan detainees 
 
49  See S.G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency”, 32 Int’l Security 7 (2008). 
50  Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Area of Operations, Detainee Operations, 
Report of Inspection, June 26, 2004, at 20. 
51  Id. 
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to the exclusive custody and control of the Afghan Government”.52 But this 
gradual transition has been slowed since then by the shakiness of Afghan 
security institutions and inability to put in place domestic legal authorities 
and processes capable of handling or prosecuting captured militants.53 
These contextual factors raise several policy questions onto which the 
law of armed conflict no longer maps so neatly: does the long-term reliance 
on military detention strengthen versus deplete or build versus undermine 
public confidence in parallel civilian justice institutions? As coalition forces 
turn over more and more security and governance functions to Afghan 
authorities, how should responsibility for detaining militants, including those 
already in custody, be transferred? Many features of this conflict are unique 
to Afghanistan, but these basic problems could likely recur in other areas 
where governance collapses, such as Somalia.  
One set of the lessons that the US military appears to have drawn in 
Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, is the strategic imperative of high substantive 
and procedural standards of detainee treatment, especially when seeking to 
bolster rule of law institutions.54 The Army and Marine Corps’ new 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual emphasizes these principles, not only for 
legal and ethical reasons, but also for military effectiveness.55 After noting, 
for example, that the “nature of [counterinsurgency] operations sometimes 
makes it difficult to separate potential detainees from innocent bystanders, 
since insurgents lack distinctive uniforms and deliberately mingle with the 
local populace”,56 the Manual goes on to warn that “treating a civilian like an 
insurgent is a sure recipe for failure”.57 It continues: 
 
[Counterinsurgency] operations strive to restore order, the rule of law, 
and civil procedures to the authority of the [host nation] government. . . . 
Multinational and U.S. forces brought in to support this objective must 
remember that the populace will scrutinize their actions. People will 
watch to see if Soldiers and Marines stay consistent with this avowed 
 
52  Press Release, US Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, “Detainee Transfers to Afghanistan”, 
Aug. 4, 2005, at: http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pr080405.html. 
53  See Human Rights First, supra note 36; Schmitt & Golden, supra note 7. 
54  See C. Gall, “U.S.-Afghan Foray Reveals Friction on Antirebel Raids”, New York Times, 
July 3, 2006, at A9; A. Rubin, “U.S. Remakes Jails in Iraq, but Gains Are at Risk”, N.Y. 
Times, June 2, 2008 at A1. 
55  Headquarters, Dep’t of the Army & Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, paras. 7-38, 7-40 (2006). 
56  Ibid., paras. 7-38 
57  Ibid., paras. 7-40. 
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purpose. Inconsistent actions furnish insurgents with valuable issues for 
manipulation and propaganda.58  
  
While the law of armed conflict has little to say directly on the issue of 
transferring detention responsibilities from military to civilian systems, the 
substantive and procedural legal issues described earlier indirectly relate to 
this transition process insofar as adherence to their standards helps lay a 




These military doctrinal emphases on detention standards imply several 
conclusions about the future development and refinement of the law of 
armed conflict, bringing the discussion back to the legal controversies 
discussed earlier. As to substantive treatment standards, the strategic 
rationale is likely to further reinforce the idea of universally applicable 
minimum requirements, despite initial efforts by the Bush administration to 
reserve greater flexibility. As to procedural requirements, in thinking about 
the future trajectory of the law of armed conflict (or the application of 
human rights law in armed conflict), the more that rule-of-law promotion 
features as a strategic objective the more robust procedural protections for 
detainees will align with military necessity, rather than collide with it. While 
this convergence is unlikely to produce legal consensus anytime soon, it 
narrows the debate and allows for more constructive dialogue between 
competing schools of legal thought.  
 
58  Ibid., paras. 8-42. 
